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Week 139 - Wednesday - 24 July 2002

HORAYOT: CHAPTER 1: MISHNAH 2

If the Bet Din gave a decision and they knew that they had erred, and they retracted, whether before they brought their atonement offering or had not yet done so, if a person acted on their decision, Rabbi Shimon frees him, but Rabbi Eliezer declares it a doubtful case. What is it that is doubtful? If he remained at home he is liable, but if he went overseas he would be free. Rabbi Akiva says: I admit that such a one is closer to being free than being liable. Ben Azzai said to him: Why is this one different from the one who stayed home? Because the one who stayed home could have heard, but this one could not have heard.

Kehati

Our mishnah continues with the subject of an individual's transgression committed on the authority of a court ruling. In the present case the Bet Din realizes its error and retracts. Since the person was not aware of it, the Sages are divided in their opinion as to whether he is bound to bring a sin-offering or not.

If the Bet Din gave a decision which nullified one of the commandments of the Torah, and the majority of the people acted on their decision, and they knew that they had erred and subsequently they realized that they had erred and they retracted their original decision, and a person acted on their original decision, whether before they brought their atonement offering - the He'alem Davar communal sacrifice. (In Mishnah 5 below, Tannaim differ as to whether it is the Bet Din itself or the community that have to bring the offering,) or had not yet done so - they had not yet brought the sacrifice to atone for their mistake, - Rabbi Shimon frees him from a sin-offering became he relied on the Bet Din, whose ruling had spread among the majority of the public, but Rabbi Eliezer declares it a doubtful case, i.e. it is not clear whether it is a case of reliance on the Bet Din or an act of his own volition (Rashi). Some commentators hold that it was his duty to keep up-to-date with regard to Bet Din pronouncements, and since he did not make any inquiries it is as if he was himself in doubt whether he had transgressed or not (Rambam), in which case he would have to bring not a sin-offering but a suspensive guilt offering, which is brought in the case of an uncertain transgression.

What is it that is doubtful? - What is the criterion for declaring it uncertain? If he remained at home and acted on the Bet Din instruction, since he could have ascertained what the position was but made no enquiries, his case is in the nature of a doubtful transgression and he is liable and must bring a suspensive offering; but if he went overseas and there acted on the Bet Din pronouncement, since there was no way for him to inquire, he would be free since he relied on the Bet Din.

Rabbi Akiva says: I admit that such a one who went overseas is closer to being free than to being liable for an offering, because he could not know of the Bet Din retraction, Ben Azzai said to him: Why is this one different from the one who stayed at home? Why are they treated differently? and Rabbi Akiva replied: Because the one who stayed home could have heard, that the Bet Din have retracted and he is therefore akin to one acting on his own volition and hence subject to a suspensive guilt offering; but this one could not have heard of the Bet Din retraction. He therefore acted solely in reliance upon them and is free. In the Gemara we learn that Ben Azzai too agrees that there is a difference between one who stayed home and one who went overseas. They differ only in the case of one who was about to go overseas when he committed the transgression. Rabbi Akiva maintains that he too should be absolved, because he cannot, on account of his burdensome preparations, be expected to make inquiries as to whether there has been a Bet Din retraction; it is as if he were already abroad. Ben Azzai says he has to bring a suspensive guilt offering since he was in fact at home. The halakhah is according to Rabbi Akiva.

HORAYOT: CHAPTER 1: MISHNAH 3

If the Bet Din rendered a decision which voided an entire perceptive body, saying there is no menstruation law in the Torah, there is no Shabbat in the Torah; there is no idolatry in the Torah, they are free. If they gave a decision annulling part and sustaining part, then they are liable. How so? They said the Torah ordains the law of a menstruant, but if he lay with her while she maintains a day-to-day observation, he is free; there is a Shabbat law in the Torah, but one carrying from a private to a public area is free; idol worship is forbidden in the Torah, but one who merely bowed is free - they are liable, for it says (Lev. 4:13) "And something be hidden," something, not the whole thing.

Kehati

This mishnah teaches that the Bet Din is obliged to bring a communal offering only if they annulled a particular detail of a commandment, but if they annulled the entire commandment they would not have to bring an offering, because no one relies on a Bet Din ruling regarding a commandment specifically stated in the Torah. The Gemara declares: "A Bet Din is liable only if it rules on a matter which the Saducees dispute (that it is forbidden; for example, if it permitted any prohibition which is not explicitly stated in the Torah), but if it is on a matter with which the Saducees also agree, they are absolved. The reason is that every school boy knows that it is forbidden.

If the Bet Din rendered a decision which voided an entire perceptive body saying, for example, there is no menstruation law in the Torah - i.e. there is no prohibition in the Torah affecting a menstruant, or there is no Shabbat in the Torah - that the Torah does not prohibit work on Shabbat, or there is no idolatry in the Torah, - since every Jew knows that these are specifically prohibited in the Torah, - they are free - the Bet Din are not called upon to bring an offering, for their decision is of no consequence, and whoever acted on it has to bring a sin-offering as any other individual who transgressed in error. If they gave a decision annulling part - of the commandment and sustaining part- of it, as will be elucidated immediately, then they are liable, if the majority of the people followed their ruling, they have to bring the communal offering. How so? How did they invalidate part and sustain part?

They said the Torah ordains the law of a menstruant, but if he lay with her while she maintains a day-to-day observation, he is free - A woman who sees a discharge after her seven-days of menstruancy has to observe one clean day against the unclean one, having to immerse on the day following the unclean one, and if there is no further show she is clean by the evening, (see our introduction to the commentary of Pesahim 8:5), but during that day she has the law of a menstruant and one lying with her is subject to karet. But the Bet Din ruled that she was not a menstruant, was clean and that he was therefore guiltless; or they said: There is a Shabbat law in the Torah, but one carrying from a private to a public area is free, because the carrying from one domain to another is not among the forbidden types of work; or they said: Idol worship is forbidden by the Torah, but one who merely bowed before the idol, is free, because this did not constitute worship, on all these they are liable for a communal offering, as we explained above, for it says (Lev. 4:13) "And something be hidden," something, not the whole thing. - The Bet Din is not liable for inadvertent decision, unless they erred in a detail of the prohibition, but if they denied the whole commandment they do not bring an offering, while those who acted on their pronouncement have to bring sin-offerings.

The Gemara concludes that the Bet Din is not liable even for the details enumerated in our mishnah, for all of these too are clearly specified in the Torah and their annulment by a Bet Din is of no consequence. The law of the day-to-day vigil is explicitly stated: (Lev. 15:28) "And she shall count for herself”, which means that she has to count a clean day against an unclean one; the prohibition of carrying from a private to a public domain on Shabbat is similarly stated (Ex. 16:29) "No man shall go out of his place" which is understood to mean, with a utensil in his hand. Also bowing down to an idol is specifically prohibited (Ex. 34:14) "You shall not bow down to a strange god." Clearly if they ruled differently on the above their decision is not considered to be a ruling, for, as we mentioned in our introduction, the Bet Din is only liable if it rules on a matter with which the Saducees do not agree. Our mishnah must therefore be understood thus: The Bet Din ruled that the Torah prohibition applies only if she observed a show during the day, because it says (Lev. 15:26) "all the days of her flux," but if she observed it at night she is permitted to her husband; or that they said: only carrying on Shabbat from domain to domain is forbidden, but one throwing or handing across is free because he does not leave his place; or, worshipping an idol means prostrating on hands and feet, but simply bowing down is of no consequence, - in all such cases, if the majority of the people acted on their ruling, the Bet Din has to bring a communal offering as prescribed, while the people themselves who have thus been misled are absolved.

Regarding the passage quoted in our mishnah "And a thing be hid from the eyes of the assembly" (vene'elam davar) which was interpreted to mean 'something' not the whole thing, i.e. only an aspect of the commandment, the Gemara gives further support, by requiring us to read the final letter 'm', of vene'elam also with the next word, making it mi-davar, giving it the meaning ‘And there be hidden from the matter,' not the whole matter (Rashi). it is not uncommon for a final consonant to be read with its own and the following word.

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